The Political Logic of Poverty Relief: Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico

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Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (Stanford University, California) Federico Estévez

The Political Logic of Poverty Relief

Electoral Strategies and Social Policy in Mexico

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (Stanford University, California), Federico Estévez, Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford University, California)

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English

Cambridge University Press
10 March 2016

Poverty & unemployment; Comparative politics; Elections & referenda; Political manifestos

Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics

Poverty relief programs are shaped by politics. The particular design which social programs take is to a large extent determined by the existing institutional constraints and politicians' imperative to win elections. The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places elections and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. Would political parties possess incentives to target the poor with transfers aimed at poverty alleviation or would they instead give these to their supporters? Would politicians rely on the distribution of particularistic benefits rather than public goods? The authors assess the welfare effects of social programs in Mexico and whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs. The book provides a new interpretation of the role of cash transfers and poverty relief assistance in the development of welfare state institutions.

By: Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (Stanford University California), Federico Estévez, Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford University, California)
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 229mm, Width: 152mm, Spine: 19mm
Weight: 550g
ISBN: 9781107140288
ISBN 10: 1107140285
Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Pages: 258
Publication Date: 10 March 2016
Audience: College/higher education , Further / Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active

Introduction; Part I: 1. Poverty relief in Latin America; 2. Poverty relief in Mexico - a geographic approach; 3. Political machines and vote buying; 4. Clientelism and the political manipulation of Pronasol; Part II: The consequences of clientelism and entitlements; 5. Improving communities - transfers and basic public services; 6. Saving lives - social programs and infant mortality rates; 7. Electoral pay-offs of antipoverty programs; Conclusion - the future of social protection.

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros is Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, California. Federico Estévez is Professor of Political Science at Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM). Beatriz Magaloni is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, California.