In the late 1990s, the issue of diamonds contributing to conflict began to receive global attention. In response, the Kimberley Process, an international agreement drawn up in 2003, was implemented to reduce the trade of conflict diamonds and provide a way to certify the global diamond trade. This study looks at the political economy of resource-wealthy states in Africa to understand responses to the Kimberley Process, asking why some African states have higher levels of compliance and co-operation than others. Using cross-country comparisons to explain differing state policies and outcomes, Nathan Munier explores whether domestic, private economic actors matter in how international agreements operate. In doing so, he asks why states that regularly ignore international agreements will use scarce resources to raise their level of compliance with the Kimberley Process. Focusing on the domestic political economy of states, in contrast to past theories of state responses to international agreements, Munier finds that economic dependence and the preferences of private actors are essential in understanding the variation of state responses to international agreements.
By:
Nathan Munier
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions:
Height: 229mm,
Width: 152mm,
Spine: 11mm
Weight: 311g
ISBN: 9781108813587
ISBN 10: 1108813585
Pages: 209
Publication Date: 20 June 2024
Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
Undergraduate
Format: Paperback
Publisher's Status: Active
1. Diamonds after blood? explaining state responses to the kimberley process in Africa; 2. The domestic political economy of international agreements; 3. From passiveness to the presidency! the changing nature of angola's responsiveness to conflict diamond regulation; 4. Diamonds, dependence and de beers: monopoly capitalism and compliance with the kimberley process in Namibia; 5. The one who controls the diamond wears the crown! the politicization of the kimberley process in Zimbabwe; 6. The limits of cooperation after conflict? the case of the kimberley process in Sierra Leone; 7. No private companies=no compliance: the crisis of the kimberley process in the central African republic; 8. Understanding the nature of the kimberley process and international agreements; Works cited; Index.
Nathan Munier is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Tokyo International University where his research areas focus on international political economy, international agreements, African Politics, conflict resources, and migration. He is the author of articles in journals including Resources Policy, Review of African Political Economy and African Security.
Reviews for The Political Economy of the Kimberley Process
'Munier elucidates the complicated domestic politics of how and why the African states have presented different responses to an international regulatory regime of conflict diamonds. He depicts the knotted problem of introducing and implementing the regulation between the private industrialists and the government actors in a fluent manner. A great addition and must-read in comparative resource politics and political economy.' Sojin Shin, Tokyo International University 'A unique contribution to comparative political economy, international regime theory, and African studies, readers will gain fresh insights into the international behavior of African states as well as the domestic and economic actors that shape compliance with international institutions. This is essential reading for those interested in richer examples from the African continent, and a prized text book for teaching advanced course seminars on international relations of African states.' Daniel Ogbaharya, Union Institute & University 'Munier's book lifts the veil on the global diamond trade to provide a theoretically informed, and empirically rich, study that will be of interest to a broad range of readers. Through his in-depth study of compliance with Kimberley Process across five Sub-Saharan African states, Munier's work offers an innovative perspective on explaining state compliance that sheds new light on the role and influence of private actors.' Christopher K. Lamont, Tokyo International University