The Political Economy of Plea Bargaining

"""The Political Economy of Plea Bargaining offers a wide-ranging exploration of the history and development of the dominant dispute-resolution mechanism in U.S. criminal law. Drawing on an eclectic mix of history, social and critical theory, political philosophy, constitutional jurisprudence, and personal reflection, the author powerfully demonstrates how procedural efficiency and an anti-democratic impulse to maintain social control over marginal populations have displaced the long-standing American commitment to trial by jury. This timely work brings a unique critical-theoretic lens to the current debate and should prompt new misgivings about the plea-bargaining paradigm."" Russell D. Covey, Law Professor and Co-Chair of the ABA Plea Bargaining Task Force ""This fresh, insightful, and wide-ranging work explores—and explodes--a leading cause of contemporary injustice—plea bargaining. Drawing on various disciplines and legal doctrine, Professor Schehr powerfully deconstructs the flawed rationales for extinguishing the fundamental right to jury trial, and catalogues the resulting catastrophic damage to U.S. law and society."" Professor Jack Chin, Professor of Law, and Director of Clinical Legal Education, UC Davis School of Law ""This captivating exploration delves into the origins and evolution of plea bargaining as a legal instrument of social control in capitalist America. Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship from Law, Political Economy, and Sociology, this must-read book offers a unique perspective on the anti-democratic nature of plea bargaining, its role within capitalist systems, and the injustices it perpetuates."" Geert Dhondt, Associate Professor of Economics, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York"