Matthias Thiemann is Assistant Professor at the Centre d'études Européens, Sciences Po Paris.
'Ten years after the Great Financial Crisis, with regulations remaining mostly unchanged, this book offers a new paradigm for designing financial regulation. Thiemann situates the rise of shadow banking in ill-designed and often highly fragmented regulatory structures - an ideal breeding ground for regulatory arbitrage. Based on a careful comparative analysis of accounting governance in several countries, he argues for greater proximity of regulators to the regulated and a diversity of perspectives to avoid cognitive capture. Even more daring, Thiemann argues that regulators should not fall for the demand by the industry for certainty but instead should force regulatory uncertainty on the financial engineers to keep them on course. When the old regulatory structure inevitably fails us again, we will be better prepared to put a new regime in place and this book offers a new, empirically grounded, strategy.' Katharina Pistor, Edwin B. Parker Professor of Comparative Law, Columbia Law School 'Matthias Thiemann's The Growth of Shadow Banking is a highly insightful contribution that provides a fresh perspective on what led to the spread of shadow banking.' Dylan Cassar, Economic Sociology