Marlene Laruelle is research professor of international affairs and associate director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She is codirector of PONARS-Eurasia and director of the Central Asia Program at GW. Her books include Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia (Palgrave, 2009), and Russia’s Strategies in the Arctic and the Future of the Far North (M.E. Sharpe, 2013). Jean Radvanyi is professor of Russian Studies and Geography at the National Institute for Oriental Languages and Cultures in Paris. He directed the French-Russian Center for Social Sciences and Humanities located in Moscow for four year, between 2008 and 2012. His books include four editions of (in French) The New Russia (Armand Colin), and Geopolitical Atlas of the Caucasus (Autrement).
"A marvellously erudite, perceptive and eminently readable analysis of Russia today and how it got to be how it is. Avoiding simplistic or essentialist explanations, the book presents a country as complex as it is troubled. This brilliant work is essential reading for anyone interested in the fate not only of Russia but of the world at large. A marvellously erudite, perceptive and eminently readable analysis of Russia today and how it got to be how it is. Avoiding simplistic or essentialist explanations, the book presents a country as complex as it is troubled. This brilliant work is essential reading for anyone interested in the fate not only of Russia but of the world at large. --Richard Sakwa, University of Kent Explaining Russia in the midst of a war that's convulsing the world order is not a task for the faint-hearted, but Laruelle and Radvanyi have done just that. With trenchant analysis of aspects as diverse as Russia's war economy, Moscow's romance with the Global South and the origins of ""Putinism,"" the authors make sense of Russia's retrenchment, even as it builds coalitions to resist U.S. hegemony. --Jill Dougherty, Former CNN Foreign Affairs Correspondent Russia's invasion of Ukraine upended Western security policy in ways that are highly inimical to Russian interests, notably the enlargement of NATO's military presence in the Baltic states and the decision by both Sweden and Finland to join the organization. That the Kremlin could have anticipated these responses raises the question of why it invaded. Laurelle and Radvanyi address this question in their survey of Russian history, emphasizing the fears of Russian elites and the general public--the fear of demographic decline and a struggling economy, but above all the fear of foreign intervention � la the color revolutions. Russia's weakness invites intervention, making the restoration of its great power status an overarching foreign policy goal. For Putin this means establishing a global presence that counters the West-centered world order. He has forged a close relationship with China, made Russia an indispensable power in Syria, and cultivated Russia's participation in BRICS. For Putin, however, this restoration of status is linked first and foremost to Russia's ability to dominate Ukraine. The book covers familiar ground but is a very useful introduction to Russia's place in international politics and to its repressive domestic policies and economic resilience under Western sanctions. Highly recommended. General readers through graduate students. -- ""Choice Reviews"" Explaining Russia in the midst of a war that's convulsing the world order is not a task for the faint-hearted, but Laruelle and Radvanyi have done just that. With trenchant analysis of aspects as diverse as Russia's war economy, Moscow's romance with the Global South and the origins of ""Putinism,"" the authors make sense of Russia's retrenchment, even as it builds coalitions to resist U.S. hegemony. Russia's invasion of Ukraine upended Western security policy in ways that are highly inimical to Russian interests, notably the enlargement of NATO's military presence in the Baltic states and the decision by both Sweden and Finland to join the organization. That the Kremlin could have anticipated these responses raises the question of why it invaded. Laurelle and Radvanyi address this question in their survey of Russian history, emphasizing the fears of Russian elites and the general public--the fear of demographic decline and a struggling economy, but above all the fear of foreign intervention � la the color revolutions. Russia's weakness invites intervention, making the restoration of its great power status an overarching foreign policy goal. For Putin this means establishing a global presence that counters the West-centered world order. He has forged a close relationship with China, made Russia an indispensable power in Syria, and cultivated Russia's participation in BRICS. For Putin, however, this restoration of status is linked first and foremost to Russia's ability to dominate Ukraine. The book covers familiar ground but is a very useful introduction to Russia's place in international politics and to its repressive domestic policies and economic resilience under Western sanctions. Highly recommended. General readers through graduate students."