We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, but efforts to spread this knowledge often encounter resistance to evidence. The phenomenon of resistance to evidence, while subject to thorough investigation in social psychology, is acutely under-theorised in the philosophical literature. Mona Simion's book is concerned with positive epistemology: it argues that we have epistemic obligations to update and form beliefs on available and undefeated evidence. In turn, our resistance to easily available evidence is unpacked as an instance of epistemic malfunctioning. Simion develops a full positive, integrated epistemological picture in conjunction with novel accounts of evidence, defeat, norms of inquiry, permissible suspension, and disinformation. Her book is relevant for anyone with an interest in the nature of evidence and justified belief and in the best ways to avoid the high-stakes practical consequences of evidence resistance in policy and practice. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
By:
Mona Simion (University of Glasgow)
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions:
Height: 235mm,
Width: 158mm,
Spine: 15mm
Weight: 480g
ISBN: 9781009298520
ISBN 10: 1009298526
Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Pages: 232
Publication Date: 15 February 2024
Audience:
College/higher education
,
Further / Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Introduction; Part I. The Epistemology and Psychology of Resistance to Evidence: 1. Resistance to evidence: triggers and epistemic status; 2. Evidence one has and the impermissibility of resistance; 3. Evidence you should have had and resistance; 4. Permissible suspension and evidence resistance; 5. Resistance to evidence, epistemic responsibility, and epistemic vice; Part II. Resistance to Evidence and Epistemic Proper Function: 6. Resistance to evidence as epistemic malfunction; 7. Evidence as knowledge indicators; 8. Defeaters as ignorance indicators; 9. Permissible suspensions and permissible withholdings; Part III. Theoretical Upshots: 10. Epistemic oughts and epistemic dilemmas; 11. Scepticism as resistance to evidence; 12. Knowledge and disinformation; Concluding remarks: the way forward in policy and practice; Bibliography; Index.
Mona Simion is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre at the University of Glasgow. Her publications include Sharing Knowledge (Cambridge, 2021) and Shifty Speech and Independent Thought (2021).
Reviews for Resistance to Evidence
'People who deny well established truths are an obtrusive feature of the contemporary world. Mona Simion argues that such denial manifests a breach of our epistemic obligation to respond to easily available evidence. As well as shedding light on an important phenomenon, she develops new accounts of evidence, defeat, disinformation and our obligations as inquirers. This rich and wide-ranging book will be essential reading for all epistemologists, as well as anyone interested in the root causes of so much contemporary political dysfunction.' Neil Levy, University of Oxford
