Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies

David Kosař (Masarykova Univerzita v Brně, Czech Republic)

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English

Cambridge University Press
11 May 2017

Comparative law; Judicial powers

Series: Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy

Judicial councils and other judicial self-government bodies have become a worldwide phenomenon. Democracies are increasingly turning to them to insulate the judiciary from the daily politics, enhance independence and ensure judicial accountability. This book investigates the different forms of accountability and the taxonomy of mechanisms of control to determine a best practice methodology. The author expertly provides a meticulous analysis, using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 and creates a systematic framework that can be applied to future cases.

By: David Kosař (Masarykova Univerzita v Brně Czech Republic)
Imprint: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: United Kingdom
Dimensions: Height: 230mm, Width: 155mm, Spine: 25mm
Weight: 720g
ISBN: 9781107531048
ISBN 10: 1107531047
Series: Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
Pages: 486
Publication Date: 11 May 2017
Audience: Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate
Format: Paperback
Publisher's Status: Active

Introduction; Part I. Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework: 1. The concept of judicial accountability; 2. Mechanisms of judicial accountability; 3. Judicial accountability and judicial councils; Part II. Holding Czech and Slovak Judges Accountable: 4. Prologue to the case studies: methodology and data reporting; 5. The Czech Republic; 6. Slovakia; 7. Evaluation: the Czech Republic and Slovakia compared; Part III. Conclusions and Implications: 8. Judicial accountability and judicial councils: critical appraisal; Annexes.

David Kosař is currently Head of the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science in the Faculty of Law, Universitas Masarykiana Brunensis, Czech Republic. He clerked for a Justice and then the Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative Court, and for a Justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic.

Reviews for Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies

'Kosar ... relies on more than 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts from 1993 to 2010 to analyze differing forms of accountability of the least accountable branch of government: the judiciary. The volume's first part lays the theoretical framework that informs the empirical analysis presented in chapters 4 to 7. It defines judicial accountability, describes its mechanisms, and overviews the role of judicial councils in insulating the judiciary from politics, enhancing its independence, and thus ensuring judicial accountability. Chapter 4 comments on the methodology of the empirical research, explaining case selection and case analysis, whereas chapters 5 to 7 compare cases from the Czech and Slovak Republics. The final chapter serves as a conclusion, arguing that the judicial council increases judicial autonomy without necessarily improving the independence of individual judges. Recommended.' L. Stan, Choice