The definitive work on the course, conduct, and aftermath of the Iraq war.
In Death, Dominance, and State-Building, the eminent scholar of conflict Roger D. Petersen provides the first comprehensive analytic history of post-invasion Iraq. Although the war is almost universally derided as one of the biggest foreign policy blunders of the post-Cold War era, Petersen argues that the course and conduct of the conflict is poorly understood. He begins by outlining an accessible framework for analyzing complex, fluid, and violent internal conflicts. He then applies that framework to a variety of diverse case studies to break down the strategic interplay among the US military forces and Shia and Sunni insurgent organizations as it played out in Baghdad, Anbar, and Hawija. Highlighting the struggle for dominance between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad, Petersen offers a reconsideration of the Surge. He also addresses failures of state-building in Iraqi Kurdistan. Critically, he shows how the legacy of the US occupation and presence from 2003-2011 shaped Iraq's political and security contours from 2011-2023. Comprehensive, analytically sophisticated, and subtle, this book draws lessons relevant to future American military interventions from what most regard as the US's most disastrous foreign policy adventure since Vietnam. The US cannot simply wish away insurgencies, which are always going to occur. The question is what the US and other great powers might do about them in the future.
Section One: Framework Chapter One: Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The US in Iraq and the Future of American Intervention Chapter Two: Analytical Framework I: Roles and Strategy Chapter Three: Analytical Framework II: Mechanisms and Strategy Chapter Four: US Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice Section Two: The Iraq Conflict 2003-2011 Preview to Section II Chapter Five: Violence, State-Building, and the Sunni-Shia Cleavage Chapter Six: Ghazaliyah: Sunni Mobilization, Sectarian War, US Success and Failure Chapter Seven: Sadr City, the Mahdi Army, and the Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad Chapter Eight: Mansour: The Failure to Mobilize Moderates Chapter Nine: The Failure to Establish Local Security Chapter Ten: Captain Wright Goes to Baghdad (co-written with Timothy Wright) Chapter Eleven: Anbar, 2003-2011: The Generation of a Community Mobilization Strategy (co-written with Jon Lindsay) Chapter Twelve: The Battle of Sadr City, 2008: Innovations in Urban Counterinsurgency Chapter Thirteen: The Surge: A Reconsideration Chapter Fourteen: Iraqi Kurdistan: Dual Cleavages and their Effect on War and State-Building Section Three: Iraq 2011-2020 Preview to Section III Chapter Fifteen: Hawija: Explaining Sunni Resurgence Chapter Sixteen: The Third Iraq War Chapter Seventeen: Hybrid Actors: The Emergence and Persistence of the Popular Mobilization Forces Chapter Eighteen: How Minorities Make Their Way in Post-ISIS Iraq: The Case of Christian Militias in the Nineveh Plain (co-written with Matt Cancian) Chapter Nineteen: The Kurdistan Regional Governate Revisited: Death, War, Machinations, and Little Change Chapter Twenty: The Decline of Dominance Politics? Emotions and Institutions in Iraq Ten Years After the 2011 US Withdrawal Section Four: The Future of American Military Intervention Preview to Section IV Chapter Twenty-One: Findings and Lessons Chapter Twenty-Two: Constraints on Learning: The Influence of the Changing International System and US Domestic Politics Chapter Twenty-Three: The Future of American Military Intervention Appendices: Appendix A: Application of Framework to Classic Theories of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Appendix B: An Application of the Framework to Review Recent Social Science Literature Bibliography Notes Index
Roger D. Petersen is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science. He holds BA, MA, and PhD degrees from the University of Chicago and has taught at MIT since 2001. Petersen focuses on within-state conflict and violence. He has written three books: Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe (2001), Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (2002), and Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (2011). He teaches courses on military intervention, civil-military relations, politics and conflict in the Balkans and the Middle East, and emotions and politics.
Reviews for Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The US in Iraq and the Future of American Military Intervention
In Death, Dominance, and State-Building, Roger Petersen displays his signature combination of intellectual creativity with careful attention to on-the ground dynamics. Petersen embeds a study of nuanced variation across time and space within a fascinating macro-level account of the politics of group competition in Iraq. This book is required reading for anyone interested in civil war, US foreign policy, or the politics of violent state-building. * Paul Staniland, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago * When it comes to studying resistance and violence inside states, few scholars are in Roger Petersen's class. Unsurprisingly, his new book on how the war in Iraq played out over time is filled with smart insights and clever analysis. Death, Dominance, and State-Building is a must read for anyone seriously committed to understanding the Iraq war. * John J. Mearsheimer, University of Chicago, and author of How States Think * Roger Petersen proves once again that he is the master of the analysis of emotion in ethnic conflict. When resentment and dominance fears are engaged, beware. Here is yet another reason to think twice before embarking on a counterinsurgency campaign. * Jack Snyder, Robert and Ren´ee Belfer Professor of International Relations, Political Science Department, Columbia University * The long-awaited study of the wars in Iraq across their full expanse from 2003 to 2020. Incisive, erudite, and revealing. * Carter Malkasian, Author of Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State *
