Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished.
He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable.
He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions.
McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality.
He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
By:
Colin McGinn ( Department of Philosophy Rutgers University New Jersey) Imprint: Oxford University Press Country of Publication: United Kingdom Dimensions:
Height: 211mm,
Width: 140mm,
Spine: 19mm
Weight: 413g ISBN:9780199267606 ISBN 10: 019926760X Pages: 264 Publication Date:25 April 2004 Audience:
College/higher education
,
Primary
Format:Hardback Publisher's Status: Active