This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law and practical ethical reflection.
Introduction Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco and George Pavlakos; Part I. Will and Blameworthiness: 1. The Problem of Pure Negligence Gideon Rosen; 2. Unwitting Omissions, Mistakes, and Responsibility Erasmus Mayr; 3. 'How Could You?': The Moral Import of Obliviousness Gideon Yaffe; 4. Varieties of Negligence and Complications for Moral Blameworthiness William FitzPatrick; Part II. Agency, Reasons and Inadvertence: 5. The Possibility of Pure Negligence Gary Watson; 6. Agent-Relativity without Control: Grounding Negligence on Normative Relations George Pavlakos; 7. The Boundaries of Negligence Matt King; 8. The Backward-Looking Puzzle of Responsibility in Negligence: Some Preliminary Thoughts for Understanding Inadvertent Actions Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco; 9. Responsibility and Agency Emmanuel Voyiakis; Part III. The Significance of Action in Negligence: 10. What is It to Do Nothing? Constantine Sandis; 11. Rape, Recklessness, and Sexist Ideology Elinor Mason; 12. From Law to Moral Philosophy in Theorizing About Negligence Benjamin C. Zipursky.
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco is Professor in Moral and Political Philosophy (Jurisprudence) at the University of Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy. Her publications include Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good (2014), and Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (co-edited with George Pavlakos, Cambridge, 2015). George Pavlakos is Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. As well as co-editor of Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency, he is an editor of Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Law, author of Our Knowledge of the Law (2007) and general editor of the book series Law and Practical Reason.
