Helps civilian and military leaders, opinion makers, scholars, and interested citizens come to grips with the realities of the 21st-century global security arena by dissecting lessons from both the past and the present.
This book accomplishes four tasks: first, it outlines the evolution of the national and international security concept from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the present; second, it examines the circular relationship of the elements that define contemporary security; third, it provides empirical examples to accompany the discussion of each element—security, development, governance, and sovereignty; and fourth, it argues that substantially more sophisticated stability-security concepts, policy structures, and policymaking precautions are required in order for the United States to play more effectively in the global security arena.
Case studies provide the framework to join the various chapters of the book into a cohesive narrative, while the theoretical linear analytic method it employs defines its traditional approach to case studies. For each case study, it discusses the issue in context, findings and outcomes of the issue, and conclusions and implications. Issue and Context sections outline the political-historical situation and answer the ""What?"" question, Findings and Outcome sections answer the ""Who?"", ""Why?"", ""How?"", and ""So What?"" questions, and Conclusions and Implications sections address Key Points and Lessons.
Foreword Preface and Acknowledgments Prologue 1. Introduction, Method, and Lessons from the Portuguese Coup of 1974 2. Stability—or Not: Lessons from Italy (1968-1983) and Western Sahara (1975-Present) 3. Stability and Security: Lessons That Should Have Been Learned in Somalia (1992-1993) and the British and American Experience in Bosnia (1992-1998) 4. Stability and Development: Lessons from Argentina (1960-Present) and Mexico (1999-Present)— Attacking the State from Within 5. Development and Governance: Lessons from Vietnam (1959-1975) and Algeria (1954-1962)— Recreating the Conditions That Lead to the Moral Right to Take Control of Government 6. Governance and Sovereignty: The British Experience in Malaya (1948-1960) and Some Contrasting Lessons from El Salvador (1979-1992) 7. From Sovereignty Back to Security—or Not: Lessons from Venezuela (1998-Present) and Uruguay (1962-2005) 8. Toward a Paradigm for Foreign Policy and Power Asset Management—or Not: The Proxy War against the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan (1979-1989) 9. Key Points and Lessons: What High Muckety-Mucks and an Enlightened Electorate Should Know about Conflict and Security in the Contemporary Global Security Arena Afterword Notes Index
Max G. Manwaring is a retired Professor of Military Strategy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, where he has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research.
